Democracy and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions are constantly discussed. The debate centers on whether democracy is possible, or if it is doomed to authoritarian and dictatorial regimes. As we reflect on the Arab Spring, and contemporary protests opposing Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, it is interesting to analyze to what extent these revolutions were successful in instituting democracy. I argue that a successful transition to a democracy in Egypt will always be hindered if the Tyranny of the Majority is not addressed.
Tocqueville’s Theory of the Tyranny of the Majority
Alexis de Tocqueville was a 19th century political theorist who claimed that the essence of democratic regimes consisted of the absolute majority, as there is nothing within a democracy to resist it. Although Tocqueville admits that a majority will always predominate over others, he also believed that liberty is endangered if there were no checks on this intense power and that the seeds of tyranny were present. He argues that if there are inadequate securities to protect against tyranny, this becomes democracy’s very weakness. He stated that, “[W]hen an individual… is wronged… to whom can he apply for redress? If to public opinion, public opinion constitutes the majority; if to the legislature, it represents the majority, and implicitly obeys its injunctions; if to the executive power, it is appointed by the majority… ”
Who are the Copts?
The Copts are the indigenous people of Egypt, where their history dates back to Pharaonic times. In 641 A.D., Egypt had been conquered by the rise of Islam, where Coptic Christians constituted approximately 80% of the population of Egypt during this time. The early relations between Copts and Muslims were relatively peaceful; however, they were not full citizens. Tensions grew and in 706 A.D., restricting laws were passed, numerous monasteries and churches were destroyed and Copts were banned from holding government positions. Any peaceful protests were met with violent retaliation, and with the falling number of the Coptic population, their vulnerability increased, both of which are trends that have continued today.
Copts in Contemporary Egypt
A minority is defined as a group within a broader society that is distinctly different from the majority of society, who often lack access to the power and status held by those who abide by the dominant norms of society, the majority. As religion is often embodied in a culture, religious groups also have minority status. Copts fall under this definition of a minority, but this does not contribute to the perceived lack of “Egyptian-ness” of Copts. It is important to establish the differences between Copts as a social group and component of Egyptian national society, and Copts as a religious group and represented by the church. Additionally, not all Copts are of the same social, political or economic standing. Some fare better than others, but due to their sectarian affiliations, they are regarded as one body, with one voice.
The Copts’ place between the state and society is highly connected to church and regime, in which the church would guarantee support for the regime if the regime stood against the ascendancy of the Islamists, or the “Islamic Street” movement. This has created a societal crisis between the nation’s Christian and Muslim groups, as the church became the sole representative of the Copts. This has only deepened religious polarization. With government emphasis on Islam as the state religion, tensions and violent outbursts against the Copts continued to grow.
The Coptic Church under Pope Shenouda III, and currently, Pope Tawadros II, is the primary voice for Copts in the public sphere. A distinctive byproduct of the January revolution was the proliferation of Coptic political participation in the ousting of Mubarak, and later, Morsi. Any grievances or demands that the Copts faced were usually confined to the church walls, where the Pope would be their liaison to the government. The Arab Spring changed this dynamic as the unity expressed in January 2011 have given Copts a new sense of political participation, one that they had never been exposed to before. This unprecedented momentum propelled the Coptic youth to organize and demonstrate for other issues pertaining to the Coptic community and representation, as they sensed the rise of dominant Islamist groups.
Shortly after the January Revolution, Islamist parties appeared on the political scene, arguing that Islam was the solution to all the state’s misfortunes and that the equality that the Christians yearned for was inharmonious with “Islamic values.” This trend of re-Islamization continued to grow, especially after the parliamentary elections of November 2011 and the presidential elections of 2012. The growing sense of danger moved the Copts to respond by trying to suppress any communal or personal differences for the sake of defending their identity, while the non-Islamist opposition constantly reaffirmed their support for their Coptic compatriots and disclaimed any tensions between the two groups.
When Morsi won the presidency in 2012, Muslim aggression towards the Copts increased as Morsi stated that, “Egypt is a Muslim country.” With Coptic churches, buildings, stores and citizens being the targets of these attacks, Coptic youth were angered and frustrated, and refused to accept inferior status in Egypt. No longer relying on the church to advance their political interests and rights, they took to Tahrir Square on June 30th, 2013. The ousting of Morsi had outraged the Brotherhood and their supporters, and when state security forces dispersed the violent sit-ins, this became an open invitation for retribution against the Christians. The Coptic community has often been the scapegoat for the country’s economic and political misfortunes. Even under the rule of El-Sisi, persecution nonetheless persisted, but to a lesser extent than that of under Mubarak and Morsi.
How does de Toqueville’s Theory apply to the Copts?
As this piece has established the role of the Copts in historical and contemporary Egypt, it has also asserted the repressive and violent nature the majority has often expressed towards the Christian minority. This Tyranny of the Majority begun during the Islamic conquest of Egypt in 642 A.D. and has continued until today. Regardless of political system – monarchy, republic, authoritarian or ‘semi-democratic,’- persecution, repression and disenfranchisement have been all too familiar to the Coptic people.
Tocqueville also states that ‘great political parties’ must be established to contribute and cater to the entire population’s interests and that the safeguarding of political rights for all those the state protects is also a responsibility of the party. The current division between State and Church is an easy tool that politicians may use to manipulate the religious divide to strengthen their own position. For the Copts, as political diversification continues to increase in Egypt, they will likely begin to stray from the representative nature of the church as their sole voice of political dissatisfaction and gravitate to a party that best reflects their beliefs. However, this will take time under El-Sisi’s controversial rule.
If the majority of Egyptian society continues to believe in the inferiority of their Coptic neighbors, persecution will continue. Along with civil society, the majority-elected officials, Morsi, the politically coherent Muslim Brotherhood, and Salafists, will continue to endorse policies that actively seek to cut Copts from the political sphere. In addition to the political repression of the community, the church will continue to be the largest representative of the grievances and demands of the group, where the legal system and police will discard any report the Copts may have on Muslim citizens for harassment or assault. This will only reinforce the religious hierarchy of the Coptic Church.
So long as Tocqueville’s Tyranny of the Majority stands, the Coptic people will remain as the nation’s scapegoat in times of economic and political strife, or during any misfortune that the state may fall victim too. This is a major concern as currently Egypt’s economic well-being is drastically declining, and the Muslim Brotherhood still opposes the rule of El-Sisi. Discrimination and persecution against the Coptic community will not cease, as the political and societal culture of division seeks to exploit the gaps between the two major religions.
A route to combat the Tyranny of the Majority is to establish a national identity not associated with religion for all Egyptians to adhere too. Separate religious identity from national identity. Although this is very challenging for the highly religious nation of Egypt, this emancipation from old titles will allow for movement within the political and social sphere of society without any stigma. This has already shown signs of beginning, with Coptic and Muslim youth demanding the secularization of the state via the removal of religion from politics. Finding that common Egyptian identity, as Nasser had attempted to do, will greatly increase national unity and tolerance for the other.
How to combat the Tyranny of the Majority?
There is hope to combat this Tyranny through the use of organized political structure, checks and balances, and representation. Although the current components of democracy in Egypt are rather limited to elections and voting, these are not the sole foundations to a strong democracy; elections are not the main requirement for a democratic system, but rather, a democracy requires a culture and state of mind that the people are in power. Unfortunately, these prerequisites are not yet present in Egypt. This is not to say that democracy will never be present in Egypt, nor that a military dictatorship or authoritarian regime are the only options to guarantee political and human rights. This is simply to reiterate the notion that the Tyranny of the Majority will always seize hold of the government, and regard any minority groups, religious or otherwise, as a threat if there are no safeguards to combat it.
The implementation of ‘real’ democracy would be a positive change in Egypt, as well as the Middle East and North Africa, and would prove far more effective than any coup or uprising. If democracy were to be implemented properly in Egypt, the chances that the government would protect, rather than oppress, its citizens, as well as improve the status of women and minorities, are much higher, and would overall raise the standard of living. It is utopian thinking to believe that Egypt will make the transition to a full liberal democracy immediately, thus, a long-term plan to assist the implementation of democracy is needed. Some ways that the implementation of democracy may occur in Egypt is through the reformation of the middle class, church and state relations, the removal of religious divides and titles, and the return of the rule of law and human rights promotions.
As discussed previously, the current economic situation is decreasing the middle class and is shifting almost half of the population into poverty. The role of a strong middle class is needed for any liberal democracy, as they elect for representatives and have more needs than just food and basic necessities. The inequalities faced by the financially disenfranchised is a direct implication for any democratic process, as it restricts and prevents this population from entering political competition. As those with superior economic resources have more influence over the state power and the setting of the agenda, they will also be the ones to be victorious in any political elections.
The main route of the government to engage in dialogues with the Coptic minority is through the church, which will highly politicize its role in Egyptian society. The church should withdraw from its politicized role of prime negotiator and instead encourage for the law to be applied effectively to revolve issues that include Christians. The Copts should invoke their rights as citizens for the law to be upheld, where the rule of law should reign and precede overall Egyptians equally. Through the legal system, this will allow for the Copts to have the chance to claim their political and religious rights as Egyptian citizens, instead of relying and waiting on the church to negotiate with the regime.
The church should also refrain from politically representing the Copts, and rather stimulate Coptic actors to protect their own interests. This will also propel the Coptic community to join political groups and movements that will best reflect their individual beliefs and values. This will establish a more robust multiparty system within democracy that will encourage political competition during elections, and a strong opposition to the dominant Islamist parties or military. A demand for the return of law will bring Egypt back from its current state of flux. Today, given the protests and political unrest in Egypt, we see the results of El-Sisi’s lack of reforming the legal, political and security spheres that are mandatory for democracy to take root.
In the securing of a safe space for freedom of speech, the next area of improvement for Egyptian democracy is within the constitution and public representation in the drafting process. The constitution is a fundamental factor in establishing democracy, along with all the value it places on human rights and individual liberties. Firstly, the constituent assembly must include all aspects of Egyptian society, “…the input of political, military, economic, and legal elites, with the public participating only through referendum,” to ensure the fairness of the constitution when applied to all Egyptians. Secondly, the new constitution should make clear the provisions for amendments, as previous regimes under Morsi and Mubarak adjusted the constitution to suit their needs. The constitution must be a constraint on the power of the president, military, government, and state. Next, the lax provisions need to be reformed to become stricter, since the invoking of the vague emergency protocols permits an unrestrained parting from the constitution. Lastly, the interpretation of the constitution needs to be restricted, as the vagueness of the constitution often rendered it worthless.
This notion was discussed in the previous section, but the departure from religious identity to a new national identity, one that encompasses all: Muslims, Christians, secularists, and all other groups, will reignite the fire of unity experienced in January 2011. National cohesion will establish that it is not one group against another, but rather the collective struggle of the Egyptian people, all of whom are battling financial insecurity, political turmoil, and increasing difficulties towards the pursuit of quality of living. In putting aside differences, the unified Egyptian citizens may realize the collective potential power they have. With a common goal in mind– the betterment of all aspects of the state of Egypt– this can become a tangible goal, as demonstrated in the revolution against Mubarak and Morsi.
To conclude, this piece has examined the case study of the Coptic minority, the piece has established the history and role of this group within the Egyptian state and the Tyranny of the Majority that they face. The question now becomes, how can we inspire change?
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Mary Beshay is a graduate of Global Political Studies from York University in Toronto, Canada. Her research focuses on International Politics and Law, Multilateral Organizations, Identity and Philosophy. Some of her favourite things include road trips, cooking different cuisines, admiring art history and movie going.
